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philosophicallyorientedreader will find Hardin must be made to existingapproaches for disand nineteenth-centurytinguishing federations from confederations.
well versedin eighteenthto illustrate Those who definefederationsin termsof a conthoughtthat he draws on frequently
the earlier understandingof specifictheoretical tract between territorialregions and a central
situationsand theirlikelyresults.Some formal governmentimplymore of a degree of equality
in therelationshipthanactually
theoristsmay be disappointedthat Hardin does and volunteerism
not develophis argumentsmorerigorously.How- exists in practice,as shown dramaticallyby the
ever the breadthof insightand richnessof em- AmericanCivil War. King also findswantingthe
federapiricallytestablepredictionsmore than compen- more common method of distinguishing
or local
sate for the more generaland less rigorousform tionin termsof degreeof decentralization
provide
of argument.There is muchgristhere,and it can autonomy.Since all centralgovernments
be furtherrefinedby formaltheorists,empirical at least some autonomyto local units("the whole
researchers,and those seekinga general under- idea of a 'unitary'statewould appear something
standingof theeternalpuzzlesand paradoxesfac- of a myth,"p. 126), some unambiguous,objective criteriaare needed for distinguishinghow
ing all humankind.
resultin
muchand whatkindsof decentralization
ELINOR OSTROM
federation.King does not thinkthatsuch criteria
existor can be provided,and, in practice,"there
Indiana University
decentraliis no observeddegreeof centralization/
marksoff
zation whichcommonlyand distinctly
federationsfromso-called unitarystates or emFederalismand Federation.By PrestonKing, pires" (p. 126). Therefore,he has no use forthe
Press, conventionaltextbookdistinctionbetweenfederal
(Baltimore:JohnsHopkinsUniversity
and unitarystatesthatobscuresrealempiricaldif1982.Pp. 159.$18.95,cloth;$6.50,paper.)
ferencessuchas thefactthat"federalUSA in. . .
Morethana decadeago WilliamRikersubtitled 1970 was far more centralized. . . than was the
Existand Does 'unitary'BritishEmpirein . . . 1920" (p. 139).
a reviewessay"Does Federalism
Although some might be persuaded by this
Politics,October1969,
It Matter?"(Comparative
pp. 135-146).His answerwas largelynegative, analysisto discardfederationas a usefulscientific
is a "legal fiction," concept,King proposesinsteada new definition.
thatfederalism
concluding
"to study Federationsare to be distinguished"solely by the
politicalscientists
and he admonished
therealforcesin a politicalsystem."In spiteof fact that its central governmentincorporates
continueto study regionalunitsintoitsdecisionprocedureon some
thisadvice,politicalscientists
basis" (p. 77). Critical
entrenched
Riker),andso itis appropri- constitutionally
(including
federalism
that "regional
the
requirement
notion
is
to
the
once
fit
to
address
seen
has
Preston
that
King
ate
again the complex issues surroundingthis representationat the centre cannot be easily
altered,as by resortto thebare majoritarianproconcept.
theory"forfederal cedure which serves normal purposes. . ." (p.
Kingdivideshis"analytical
as political 143). Accordingly,the United States is a federaunionintodiscussionof federalism
in the
institu- tion because of equal state representation
as a particular
ideologyand federation
resort
to
without
which
be
altered
cannot
Senate,
has
federalism
ideology,
As
relationship.
tional
amendmentprocedure.Kinginin theconstitutional
been favoredby thosewho seek "diversity
However,as tends this definitionto be of "a constitutional
unity"(p. 20 in politicalregimes.
as kind . . . whetherthese arrangementsare writKingclearly
shows,thisnotionis so ambiguous
on men'sminds"
imprinted
tenon paperor firmly
and
of
specific
to encompassa wide variety
politicalprograms.He analyzes (p. 145), but he is carefulnot to leapfrogintoany
contradictory
ideology:as an argu- empiricalconclusions.
of federalist
threevarieties
the
Thus, King has embracedenthusiastically
in TheFederalist;as an
mentforcentralization
in the diverse legal fictionsthat definefederationsas the best
argumentfor decentralization
theoriesof Prodhoun,Calhoun,Bakunin,and approach for findingout if they matter.Most
Kropotkin;and as a meansof politicalpower readersshouldbe persuadedthatKing's approach
balance. Federalism'suse on behalfof such is likelyto permita more objectiveclassification
makesituselessas a labelfora thantheotherapproacheshe discusses.(Although
purposes
divergent
manywillobject that,forsome hardcases, deterideology.
coherent
con- mining what constitutes "constitutionallyento establish"a defensible
King'sattempt
(p. trenched" representationis difficult,as in the
to thenatureof federation"
ventionrelating
partof Frenchcumul des mandats. King could help his
and innovative
14)is themoreinteresting
workcan be case by a more completelistof examples.)Howthisbook. Beforeusefulempirical
improvementever, many readers, unlike King, will also find
matters,
done to see if federation
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judg- briefreference
inhisanalysis
foran intuitive
reinforcement
to the latterand startlingly
few
maynotmatter.
mentthatfederation
to theformer,
a fieldin whichhe is a
references
Yet Olson's thesisis most
major contributor.
WILLIAM E. HUDSON
withtheworkof hiscolleaguesfrom
compatible
College
Providence
It is also
Virginia.
Blacksburg
and,now,Fairfax,
withthosepoliticaltheorists
including
consistent
WilliamRiker,andJohnFerejohn
E. P. Herring,
fortheinefficienThe Rise and Decline of Nations:Economic whohaveshowntheconditions
By cy of logrolling
and Social Rigidities.
and interest
Stagflation,
politicians
Growth,
among&
MancurOlson.(NewHaven,Conn.:YaleUni- groups.One simplycannotgrasp the current
versity
Press,1982.Pp. xi + 273. $14.95.)
of theWestern
democracies
economicdifficulties
ofpublicchoice,andOlsondoes
without
a theory
In one of the most publicizedand quickly not supply one. There are few politicians,
reviewed
booksinmodernsocialscience,Mancur bureaus,andbureaucrats
in TheRiseandDecline
problem ofNations.
Olson has againtackleda momentous
and
withhis accustomedenergy,imagination,
extensive
Olson'svividdescriptions,
data,and
someoriginality.
of thesocialand economicdiffiinterpretations
intotherise cultiesare persuasiveand eloquent.He has a
Although
Olsonbeginshisinquiry
of remarkabletalentfor combiningsobrietyof
anddeclineofnationswitha detailedsummary
Action thoughtwith formalbut gracefulprose. His
hisearliervolumeTheLogicof Collective
Press, 1971), perceptive reasonableness,
(Harvard University
gentlelogic,and desireto combookis rooted municate
readersmaynotethatthecurrent
withtheeducatedlaymanare manifest
on inflation,
in
notso muchin thegeneralthesisof TheLogic, on everypagebutthelastchapter
as it is in a footnote whichthe analysisis on another,higherlevel.
theorem,
i.e., thefree-rider
notonlydoesOlsontakea longstep
andequity Nevertheless,
on page124dealingwiththeefficiency
of
towardBlacksburg
(Fairfax)in hisrecognition
of pressure
groupactivity.
of interest
theperversity
groups,butalso in his
of pressure frankandrepeated
thattheresults
It doesnotfollow
admonitions
aboutthefundamuchless
wouldbe harmless,
groupactivity
ofinofthemicrofoundations
mentalimportance
desirable,even if the balanceof power
flationand,indeed,all economicpolicy.
of
fromthemultiplicity
resulting
equilibrium
thetitleof thebooksuggests
thatall
Although
group
groupskeptanyone pressure
pressure
himOlsonconfines
be considered,
outofline.Evenifsucha pressure nationsmight
getting
from
self largelyto the democracieswhereinterest
fairness
to
withperfect
worked
groupsystem
groupshavelongexistedand hadtimeto rigidify
everygroup,it wouldstilltendto workinhe
skillandoriginality
society.Withconsiderable
rationalpoliciescanefficiently....Coherent,
ad hoc
ofseparate
a series
notbeexpected
from
showshowthedevastation
ofWorldWarII wiped
todiverse
interest
groups.
concessions
theslatecleanof interest
and
groupsinGermany
intoeconomic
developJapanso thatthetake-off
Muchof TheRiseandDeclineofNationscon- mentcouldprocedewiththeremarkable
results
the wehaveall observed.
elaborating
argument
sistsof a theoretical
Olsonalsoapplieshistheory
andsupported
bya vastarrayofdiverse to Americanregionaldevelopment
footnote
and thenew
thatare capitalist
howthoseinterests
nationaldatashowing
economies
ofKorea,HongKong,Singathatat once pore,and Taiwan. His book willsurelyspawn
organizedwillevolveintoa system
of theprivateeconomy dozensof articles
decreasestheefficiency
and doctoraldissertations.
and shiftsthe concernsof politicstowarddistoOlsonforthis
areindebted
Politicalscientists
devel- stimulating
issues.The nineimplications
tributional
andambitious
to writea theory
effort
on ofpolitical
summarized
3 areconveniently
opedinchapter
In hissometimes
quaintand
economy.
is essentially
correct, subtlemanner,
page 74. Olson'sargument
he hasmanagedoncemoreto adHe focuseshisattention dressthebig issuesand makesenseof themin
butitis also incomplete.
andequityand nontechnical
between
efficiency
on theconflict
amonghis
languagebothrespectable
howbothsuffer peersand accessibleto noneconomists.
byshowing
resolvestheconflict
His only
interest remaining
protectionist
froma highlyrigidified
intotheframetasksareto incorporate
groupeconomy.WhatOlsonhas notdoneis to worka theory
of publicchoiceand to givesome
showhowthepolityitselfhascreatedtheseprob- indication
of howit mightbe possibleto reform
of the politicsby using an inefficient
lems,and whyit is in the self-interests
redistributive
to politic.
to engagein ad hoc concessions
government
silenton this
thoseinterests.
Olson is strangely
WILLIAM C. MITCHELL
in public
of particular
importance
phenomenon
Olson makesbut one University
choiceand rent-seeking.
of Oregon
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